

Action Required by the Security Committee  
Implementing Recommendations by the President's  
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Recommendation No. 4

That, within each sensitive agency where the practice is not now being followed: (a) strict personnel security standards, including standards of personal conduct, be applied to all personnel having access to sensitive information or sensitive operations; (b) that these standards be applied equally to civilian and military personnel regardless of rank; and (c) that serious questions of doubt concerning personnel having such access be resolved in favor of the national security.

ACTION:

The proposal by the Special Clearance Center, CIA, for uniform personnel security procedures for access to [REDACTED] T-KH and SI information would satisfy this recommendation. The proposal is particularly applicable since in the DCI's response to this recommendation it was indicated that personnel security criteria for access to sensitive information should be uniform.

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Recommendation No. 6

That, as a means of achieving major counterintelligence objectives, actions be taken within the sensitive agencies, as required, to assure the conduct of periodic, comprehensive, inspections concerning the adequacy of compliance with approved policies relating to personnel security investigations and clearances, security suspension of employees, physical security, document control, and the like.

ACTION:

In the DCI's response to this recommendation it was indicated that the Security Committee could assist in the development of a uniform inspection format. It is proposed that this format be submitted to the Security Committee Members for their comment and consideration to develop a uniform format for community use.

Recommendation No. 9

That, in the continuing effort to instill an enhanced sense of security responsibility on the part of all personnel in the sensitive agencies, the Dunlap case be used in the security indoctrination processes of those agencies as a striking example of a most serious espionage penetration and of the failure to inculcate the degree of security consciousness which should obtain among the personnel of all sensitive agencies.

ACTION:

In the DCI's response it was indicated that the Security Committee could prepare standardized write-ups of actual security cases for use in security reindoctrinations. Recent cases such as the Dunlap and Hamilton cases could be prepared in appropriate form for circulation to the Security Committee Members for use in their reindoctrination programs.

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Recommendation No. 10

That investigative and security-review personnel associated with sensitive activities be provided with more sophisticated and professional information and guidance concerning the nature and potential security implications of abnormal sexual activities, such as homosexuality and perversion, which they encounter in the course of their inquiries and interviews.

ACTION:

In the DCI's response to this recommendation it was indicated that there should be approved definitions and criteria concerning the problems of homosexuality and perversion. [REDACTED] Chief, IRD, is now preparing a glossary of definitions and a study involving these matters. He is preparing this in coordination with the Medical Staff, CIA. When his report is completed it will be submitted to the Security Committee for consideration.

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